Fair-market activists build a competitive environment : in Peru, advocacy is key to implementing competition policy by Anthony, Debra
The major challenges facing Peru’s competition authority
today are to modernize its communications network and
deal with the consequences of trade agreements the
country has signed with other nations.
It is a remarkably tranquil existence for an agency that was
born in a period of turmoil and that passed its early years
in a constant state of challenge. The National Institute for
the Defence of Competition and Protection of Intellectual
Property, INDECOPI by its Spanish acronym, was first estab-
lished in late 1992. At that time, Peru was instituting a
tough new structural adjustment program to stem the
political crisis generated by inflation, recession, foreign
currency scarcity, and insurgency. Indeed, INDECOPI was
part of a package of free market reforms that then-
President Alberto Fujimori instituted after he dissolved
Congress.
INDECOPI has now matured, says its president Jaime Thorne.
It now “has its place in people’s minds,” says Beatriz Boza,
who ran the agency for close to six years during its period
of rapid development in the late 1990s. “The powers of
INDECOPI are not questioned,” she adds. It is stable and
reliable, and that is the source of its power. Its consistency
has given it an enviable track record of decisions upheld in
judicial courts.
INDECOPI’s journey to become a respected authority figure
is detailed in the IDRC-supported 2005 study, Tailor-Made
Competition Policy in a Standardizing World: A Study from
the Perspective of Developing Economies.
Boza led the research in association with a non-profit think
tank, Instituto Apoyo, and the non-governmental organiza-
tion, CAD Ciudadanos al Día. The study outlines how




















Fair-Market Activists Build a Competitive
Environment
In Peru, advocacy is key to implementing competition policy.
If it plays its cards right, a competition authority can instill fair-market values
within a society. Early on, Peru’s competition authority created allies, educated
the public, and found innovative ways to make competition policy work in a
developing economy.
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C a s e s t u d y
THE POWER OF COMPETITIVE MARKETS
Competition
and Development
Before it could educate the rest of the country, the agency had


















in developing countries: a lack of technical expertise, an
undeveloped competition mindset, a tradition of govern-
ment intervention, and business people who rely on
anticompetitive behaviour to make a profit.
A one-stop shop
The agency, which began operating in March 1993, is a
one-stop shop for market-related matters. In addition to
competition law enforcement, it deals with consumer pro-
tection, unfair advertising, dumped or subsidized imports,
government regulations that restrict market access, techni-
cal and regulatory standards, trademarks, patents and
copyrights, and bankruptcy.
Such a wide range of responsibilities prompted one
government minister to label it a “Frankenstein.”
INDECOPI’s design and operation made it unique among
competition authorities. “The agency manages many
different statutes … In any other country these statutes
would be regulated by different agencies,” Boza says. It
has seven autonomous commissions that specialize in
different aspects of the free market, and three offices
dealing with intellectual property issues.
INDECOPI spent its first two years on its internal organiza-
tion and formal duties. “Cases were being filed and han-
dled […] and the agency was already having an impact on
public opinion on two issues: intellectual property viola-
tions and a little bit in terms of consumer protection,”
Boza recalls.
But in 1995, it embraced the full breadth of its mandate
and started to build a robust economic system within the
country. As the study points out, the real “challenge was
not to supervise the market, but to help create a market
to supervise.”
To do that, INDECOPI became something of an activist. It
construed its mission as completely restructuring Peru’s
market landscape and institutionalizing that transforma-
tion. Through a series of initiatives designed to bolster
political will, educate all strata of Peruvian society, deter
anticompetitive behaviour, and enlist the support of stake-
holders in the new economic regime, INDECOPI fashioned
a place for itself and its work in Peru.
In its early years, the agency was primarily funded by
government transfers. It only partially lived on the fees it
collected for trademark registrations and bankruptcy fil-
ings. Today, it is almost entirely funded in this manner. Its
current budget is 51 million soles (around US$17.5 million),
which Boza marvels at.
“It’s three times more than we ever saw,” she says.
Building human capital
To accomplish its task, INDECOPI put competition advocacy
at the centre of its strategy. “You can impose sanctions and
enforce rights,” says Boza, “but how do you explain to an
economy in transition the dictates of the new law and the
rights and responsibilities that businesses and individuals
have under the new economic regime?”
Before it could educate the rest of the country, the agency
had to find a way of recruiting capable staff. There was a
need, according to the study, for “qualified, highly knowl-
edgeable and committed staff. INDECOPI, however,
suffered from the malady that afflicts many government
entities: poor salaries and the perception that state jobs
are inferior to those in the private sector.”
An aggressive recruitment policy outside and inside the
country garnered what Boza describes as “the brightest
and best talent” available. Working at INDECOPI was
relabelled a “civil service” and generous education and
travel policies added to the agency’s reputation as an
excellent training ground for bright and ambitious
university graduates.
Trial by fire
In mid-1995, the first major test of the authority’s mettle
appeared in the form of a price-fixing case against wheat-
flour producers and their trade association. The case was
important for INDECOPI because it helped cement its
powers and laid the foundations for future operations.
Alarmed by the rapid, drastic decline in the price of local
wheat flour within two months of trade liberalization and
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the ensuing price war among domestic producers, the
industry’s trade association agreed to standardize — and
hike — prices in July 1995. Shortly after, AIP, a small
association of bakeries in Lima, announced retail bread
price increases to offset the rise in the price of flour.
Homemakers from Lima’s poor neighbourhoods picketed
the Ministry of Agriculture in protest.
INDECOPI’s first task was to dissuade the government from
reverting to old price control practices. As the study
explains, INDECOPI sent messages to top policymakers and
their advisors pointing out that “only competition policy
could ensure fairness for everyone within the free market.
As a result the competition authority should be trusted to
investigate the case and resolve any anticompetitive
behaviour through regulatory sanctions, free of
intervention.”
After it filed charges against 18 wheat-flour producers,
their trade association, and the AIP, INDECOPI tackled the
next hurdle: its own lack of expertise and available person-
nel to conduct a full-scale investigation. It borrowed econ-
omists from the Ministry of Economy and Finance and
requested technical aid from the United States. The US
Department of Justice taught INDECOPI staff how to carry
out a large-scale investigation, imparting such tips as the
need to quickly seize all the defendant’s internal docu-
ments before the company realizes their strategic
importance.
After painstaking investigative work, INDECOPI’s Free
Competition Commission fined 11 of the 18 producers
for price-fixing. The ruling held up under two rounds of
appeals, in 1996 and 1999. The AIP settled and agreed to
refrain from recommending bread prices.
Throughout the case, INDECOPI published notices in the
newspapers explaining its role and correcting misconcep-
tions about it and its impartiality. The notices gave
journalists valuable important information and presented
INDECOPI as an organization concerned with transparency
and accountability.
Competition advocate
Although the case was successful, it highlighted several
deficiencies in the legislation that had created the insti-
tute. For example, the maximum fine of US$50 000 did not
always constitute a sufficient disincentive. An INDECOPI
analysis of the deterrent effect of fines paved the way for
legislation in 1996 that allowed it to impose larger penal-
ties. The maximum fine for price-fixing was set at 10 percent
of the defendant’s sales. The new law also gave INDECOPI
robust discovery and investigatory powers.
Having successfully collaborated with the US Department
of Justice, INDECOPI began to regularly interact with com-
petition agencies from other countries, including from the
Andean Community and MERCOSUR. In the aftermath of
the case, however, the institute also concluded that it
needed its own pool of experts. This was “the genesis of
INDECOPI’s decision to assemble a centralized staff of full-
time economists and outside consultants,” says the study.
The Economics Studies Unit today provides detailed market
analyses used by the commissions.
The wheat-flour case helped set the model for INDECOPI’s
advocacy strategy. INDECOPI launched several initiatives.
For example, it set up the Consumer Attention Service,
which provides the public with free and quick complaint
resolution services. It also started publishing resolutions
issued by its commissions as a means of informing the pub-
lic about consumer rights. It introduced educational pro-
grams on the free market regime, as well as seminars and
conferences with stakeholders such as civil society organi-
zations, judges, and businesses. It increased its communica-
tions with the media and provided technical, economic,
and legal opinions to Congress.
The emphasis on advocacy led the agency to change the
way in which it interacted with market violators: it decided
to issue an explanatory warning letter before taking puni-
tive action. According to the study, the institute believed
that “rather than exercising regulatory powers,” its job
was “to identify and provide critical market information
that would allow the market to correct its own failures.”
INDECOPI franchises
Also realizing that “alone it had neither the resources nor
the political and social capital necessary to achieve the
transformation of the society that it had undertaken,”
INDECOPI launched one of its more innovative ventures:
partnerships with well-respected institutions outside of
Lima to bring its services to the rest of Peru.
The thinking behind the establishment of these decentral-
ized offices, Boza explains, was that “if fast food franchises
can sell meals that look the same, taste the same, feel the
same in New York, Berlin, and Lima, why can’t we as gov-
ernment officials do the same?”
Homemakers from Lima’s poor neighbourhoods protested













The practice of franchising created “symbiotic relationships
with pre-existing institutions” such as universities, cham-
bers of commerce, and non-governmental organizations,
thus requiring very little capital investment. The institu-
tions chosen were well regarded within their communities.
“The advantage is credibility. When we delivered the mes-
sage it was being internalized and translated by someone
who had standing in the local community,” Boza explains.
A respected institution
INDECOPI’s strategies paid off. Each year between 1994
and 2002, a survey of political and economic sector opinion
leaders ranked it among the country’s top five most effi-
cient public and private entities. In 1999 and 2000, it
occupied the top spot.
In an October 2007 Universidad de Lima survey, people in
Lima’s metropolitan area ranked INDECOPI seventh out of
32 state institutions, with a 58 percent approval rating.
INDECOPI has tripled its caseload over the last 15 years and
97 percent of its decisions have been confirmed by judicial
courts, says current president Jaime Thorne. Last year the
agency handled 46 000 competition cases; they involved
consumer protection, unfair advertising, competition, mar-
ket access, technical standards, and bankruptcy filings.
INDECOPI’s success is due mainly to how it interprets its
mission, Boza states. The agency has used its power more
to facilitate than enforce.
“It’s not the police officer, it’s not the enforcer, it’s not the
idea of the powerful, bureaucratic father figure,” she says.
“It’s more the service-oriented mother figure that also has
authority and will eventually use sanctions.”
This case study was written by Debra Anthony, a writer in
Mexico City.
The views expressed in this case study are those of
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